Invisible Threats in the Cloud: Side-Channel and Shared-Resource Attacks

Author(s)	Abhijit Dadaso Dombale, Prof. Pooja Tupe
Country	India
Abstract	Cloud computing environments rely heavily on shared hardware resources and multi-tenancy to provide scalable and cost-efficient services. However, shared-resource architectures introduce hardware-level security risks that traditional software isolation mechanisms cannot fully prevent. This research presents a practical Proof-of-Concept implementation of a cache-based Prime+Probe side-channel attack using Windows Subsystem for Linux 2 (WSL2). The study demonstrates how an attacker process can infer victim activity through cache timing analysis in a shared-resource environment. Experimental results showed significant timing variations during victim execution, confirming the possibility of hardware-level information leakage despite logical isolation. The findings highlight the importance of hardware-aware cloud security mechanisms and demonstrate how consumer-grade systems can reproduce realistic side-channel attack behavior for cybersecurity research and education.
Keywords	Cloud Security, Side-Channel Attack, Prime+Probe, Cache Timing Attack, Shared Resources, Multi-Tenancy, WSL2, Cybersecurity, Hardware Security, Cloud Computing
Field	Computer > Network / Security
Published In	Volume 7, Issue 3, May-June 2026
Published On	2026-05-23

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